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During the 2005 calendar year, LLNL provided health physics support for the Highly 
Enriched Uranium Transparency Program (HEU-TP) in external and internal radiation 
protection and technical expertise into matters related to BDMS radioactive sources and 
Russian radiation safety regulatory compliance.  For the calendar year 2005, there were 
161 person-trips that required dose monitoring of the U.S. monitors.  Of the 161 person-
trips, 149 person-trips were SMVs and 12 person-trips were Transparency Monitoring 
Office (TMO) trips.  Additionally, there were 11 monitoring visits by TMO monitors to 
facilities other than UEIE and 3 to UEIE itself.  There were two monitoring visits (source 
changes) that were back to back with 16 monitors.  Each of these concurring visits were 
treated as single person-trips for dosimetry purposes.  Counted individually, there were 
191 individual person-visits in 2005. The LLNL Safety Laboratories’ Division provided 
the dosimetry services for the HEU-TP monitors.  
External Dosimetry  
LLNL provided 1004 TLD dosimeters in 2005 for monitoring for potential external dose: 
344 personal dosimeters, 480 control dosimeters and 180 spares to UEIE and TMC in 
Moscow.  Approximately 590 of the dosimeters supplied were returned and were not 
read.  This number includes the unused spare dosimeters from UEIE and Moscow and 
both the personal and control arbitration TLDs left in Russia until a post trip dose letter is 
provided.  The current agreements require only one set of two U.S. TLDs for each 
monitor visiting any of the Russian plants.  An additional 77 dosimeters were used for an 
ongoing study of the impact of the airport x-ray security screening on the TLD recorded 
dose.
In 2005, all HEU-TP monitors went on assignments in Russia with a complete set of 
personal and control dosimeters.  In order to avoid a failure of a trip mission due to lost 
dosimeters at customs, a pool of 60 spare dosimeters is maintained at TMC in Moscow, 
in addition to the 30 spare TLDs at the TMO.  The spare dosimeters are exchanged semi-
annually.  Customs letters for both the U.S. and Russian customs were included in the 
dosimeters packages for each trip to facilitate customs inspections if needed.   LLNL 
retrieved all 2005 arbitration dosimeters from the monitored Russian nuclear facilities
with the exception of the arbitration TLDs for the last trips.  These arbitration TLDs will 
be retrieved by the first trips in 2006.  
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In 2005 LLNL provided DOE’s HEU-TP management with post trip dose reports after 
each trip.  All HEU monitors received zero doses from external radiation exposure in 
2005.  Based on our studies of the x-ray exposure during flight and during luggage 
screening at airports, the reliable lower limit of external dose (TLD) determination was
set to 20 mrem in the first quarter of 2005.  Evaluation of the new limit according to the 
DOE Standard for Performance Testing of Personnel Dosimetry Systems DOE/EH-0027 
is provided in Appendix A, reporoducedfrom the 2004 Annual Health Physics Report.  
External dose investigations
For any dosimeter reading above 10 mrem, the arbitration TLD was analyzed together 
with the reported dose from the Russian TLD (if provided to the US team) in order to get 
assurance that the monitor has/ has not received occupational dose from the HEU 
assignment in Russia. There were six external dose investigations of measured individual 
doses by the TLDs (MPA – 2;  UEIE – 1;  ECP – 0; SChE – 3).  These results in 
question were very close to the investigation limit (10 mrem) and there is indication that 
they were caused by radiation type or levels very unlikely to be encountered in the visited 
facilities or caused by issues associated with the control TLDs.  Furthermore, the 
information about the activities, area visited and time spent by the monitors did not 
support the likelihood of significant occupational exposures.  The investigations in all 
cases determined that the TLD readings were not associated with occupational exposure; 
rather they were likely caused by multiple exposures at airport luggage x-ray screenings
and statistical fluctuations.  The accumulated personal dose history, the arbitration TLDs, 
and the radiological data from the plants were very helpful for resolving the exposure 
investigations.  
Exposures from screening luggage at airports
LLNL conducted studies of the effect of airport security x-ray screening of the checked-in and 
hand-carried luggage.  The tests indicate that checked-in luggage on international and domestic 
flights is exposed, on average, to 20-80 mrem (and in some cases on non-HEU foreign travel, to 
over 200 mrem).  There is evidence that not all airports (domestic and international) have 
installed or use new x-ray units with increased exposure levels.  The average dose data from the 
x-ray screening of checked-in luggage from trips to Ekaterinburg, Seversk, Tomsk, Washington 
D.C., and New York (JFK) was provided in last year’s Annual Health Physics report, Appendix 
B.  On the other hand, the hand-carried luggage on international and domestic flights is exposed 
on average to 1-8 mrem.  A detailed discussion on the impact of these exposures was provided to 
HEU management in a November 11, 2003 memo.  To minimize the effects of airport x-ray 
screening on the evaluated personal doses, our procedures require that the TLDs be transported 
in a hand-carried luggage. 
No other external dose and radiation safety concerns were raised during the 2005
calendar year.
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Internal Dosimetry  
A total of 173 bioassay samples were submitted in 2005: 156 post-trip (for uranium) and 
17 baseline samples (for uranium and plutonium). There are 5 outstanding bioassay 
samples yet to be submitted. All HEU-TP monitors who participated in assignments in 
Russian uranium processing facilities have provided baseline bioassay samples.  All 
analyzed bioassay samples from 2005 calendar year showed results that were below or at 
the normal background level.  Currently there are 17 bioassay samples that are in the 
process of being analyzed. No other internal dose and corresponding radiation safety 
concerns were raised during 2005 year.  The internal dose is assigned based on the 
bioassay result (content of uranium compounds in urine), appropriate biokinetic models, 
chemical and physical form of uranium compounds and other pertinent information.  The 
minimum detectable internal dose (MDD) from uranium bioassays depends on several 
factors, two of which are the chemical and physical form of the uranium compound and 
the time elapsed between a potential uranium intake and the time the bioassay sample 
was provided.  Appendix B provides values of MDD for various uranium compounds and 
times of providing the bioassay sample. The information underscores the importance of 
providing a bioassay sample as soon as possible and of adhering to the safety precautions.  
In 2005, LLNL provided DOE’s HEU-TP management with quarterly internal dose 
reports (bioassay reports) containing information on the internal dose, the baseline 
bioassays, the procedure compliance and the status of bioassay samples received, 
analyzed and in process of being analyzed. The established bioassay procedure requires 
each monitor to provide a post trip bioassay sample within 3 days of arrival in the USA.  
For 2005 calendar year, 92% of the samples were in compliance with this requirement, 
with the average time interval between the arrival of the monitors in the USA and the 
providing of the post trip bioassay sample being 1.42 days.  Only 6 monitors have 
provided bioassay sample more than 10 days after their return to the U.S.A.  Appendix C
of this report has a chart providing information on the bioassay sample compliance for 
2005 calendar year.
HEU health physics information database
LLNL maintains a confidential database for the HEU radiation protection data.  The 
database contains historical external and internal dose information for every HEU-TIP 
monitor, as well as specific information for each trip, TLDs supplied, returned or left in 
Russia, baseline bioassays, and monitor’s data.  The health physics database is essential 
for generating the post trip and the annual dose reports.  The HEU health physics 
database was modified in 2005 to meet DOE requirements for handling of confidential 
information.  Further changes that need to be incorporated include the tracking of the 
quarterly bioassay reports and the annual reports to DOE and to individual monitors.  In 
order to comply with the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1984, we have obtained and 
filed signed Radiation Exposure Release forms for all HEU-TP monitors that had 
assignments in the calendar 2005.  This information is also kept in the health physics 
database and is updated as new monitors are added to the active monitors list.  The 
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individual annual occupational dose information for each monitor for 2005, detailing the 
total dose as well as the external and internal doses from each monitoring assignment, 
was mailed to each monitor in the first quarter of 2006.
2005 Radiological data from the Russian plants
The 2005 radiological data, received from the Russian uranium processing plants under 
the HEU agreement, do not indicate that there are radiological concerns for the U.S.  
monitors working in Russia who follow the work and personnel protection guidelines. 
Plant’s radiological data include gamma exposure rates, airborne and removable surface 
contamination levels in the areas visited by the U.S. monitors.  These data supplement the 
information from the U.S. dosimeters and the bioassay sample analysis.  In 2005 
agreements have been reached or confirmed with plant’s radiation safety management to 
provide the radiological data in more useful form to us.  From radiation safety point of 
view specific radiological data should be available for each time interval (hour) the U.S. 
monitors are in a radiological environment.  Since such detailed data are not likely to be 
provided by the plants, an acceptable compromise is to have data averaged over one day 
or less desirable averaged over the 5 working days of a SMV.  As per these verbal 
agreements, next year (2006) the U.S. teams are expected to receive plant’s radiological 
data as follows:
- MPA – Data for each monitoring day will be provided at the end of the current SMV.  
Each day data will be on a separate sheet.  There is no change in the data form 
from the previous year.
- ECP - Data for each monitoring day will be provided at the next SMV.  The 
agreement was reached during the source change in March 2005.  Prior to that 
SMV the data used to be provided averaged for a calendar quarter.
- SChE - Data will be provided averaged over the five SMV days at the end of the 
current SMV.  No change is anticipated in the data format from 2005 year.
- UEIE - for SMVs assignments
Averaged over the five SMV days data will be provided during the next SMV 
or to the TMO monitors.  The data need to be requested in writing each time.  
This agreement was achieved during the source change in December 2005.  
Up until now the data were provided irregularly (in intervals from two to six 
months) and averaged over various periods (from 2 to 6 months).
for TMO assignments
Data will be provided averaged over one month upon a written request.  This 
agreement was achieved during the source change in December 2005.  Prior to 
December 2005, one set of data were provided for SMV and TMO monitors 
averaged over irregular periods varying from 2 to 6 months. 
The graphs in Appendix D (Appendix D is a separate C/FIG-MOD document) provide 
the gamma exposure levels, airborne and surface contamination in the monitoring points 
for each of the plants in 2005.  The guiding action levels are provided at the left of the 
graphs.  Some surface contamination values for the Siberian Chemical Enterprise (SChE) 
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conversion plant exceed the “low dose level” (no U.S. concern level) which provides 
further emphasis to the requirement that monitors use personal protective equipment (lab 
coats, gloves, etc.) and avoid touching Russian equipment.   Detailed plant radiological 
data along with the action levels and the recommended precautions were included in the 
dosimetry package for each SMV and TMO trip in 2005. 
Health physics support of the BDMS activities
During CY 2005 LLNL provided support in the dose rate measurements around the
Blend Down Monitoring Systems (BDMSs) for Russian regulatory compliance and in the 
development of procedures for the californium sources relative measurements.  LLNL 
also provided neutron dosimetry support to the Ural Electrochemical Integrated Plant 
(UEIE), Russian Federal Nuclear Center - Institute of Technical Physics (VNIITF, C-70)
and ElectroChemical Plant, Zelenogorsk (ECP).
Neutron and gamma dose rate measurements for regulatory compliance
The quality of the dose rate measurements for regulatory compliance was significantly 
improved at all sites in 2005.  A consistent dose rate measurement methodology was used
in all Russian plants.  This methodology improves the accuracy and allows a better 
comparison of measurement results from different years and different sources.  The 
improved quality and accuracy of the measurement results provide additional confidence 
in the source characteristics and their proper installation and manipulation.  During the 
UEIE and ECP source replacement visits, detailed dose rate measurements were 
performed and the measurement results were included in the radiation safety reports. The 
radiation safety reports indicate that during and after source installation and source 
replacement the individual doses, as well as the gamma and neutron dose rates around the 
BDMS, did not exceed the Russian radiation safety limits.  We now apply more relaxed 
radiation dose rate regulatory limits based on lower occupancy levels of the BDMS 
premises at all three plants.  The relaxed limits will allow the use of stronger sources that 
can improve the accuracy of the mass flow measurement and can increase the time 
between source changes resulting in substantial savings to the HEU-TP. 
Relative Cf source measurements
LLNL assisted in developing procedures for the californium sources relative 
measurements at the blend point locations and coordinated the procedures with the 
VNIITF staff.  LLNL assisted in the analysis of the raw data from these measurements 
and concluded that they are consistent with the data from the old (removed) californium 
sources, the “reference” californium sources and the source passports data. The relative 
measurements between the old (removed), ”reference”, and the currently installed 
californium sources at all plants provide assurance that the BDMS neutron sources are 
not a cause of any anomalies in the mass flow data. The source measurements data 
provide also seamless continuation of quality mass flow data after the californium 
sources are replaced in two years.  
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TV monitoring system and neutron detection equipment
We are now using technology that allows monitoring of the process of californium source 
change and source relative measurements.  The U.S. supplied neutron detection system
(NDS) allows a substantial reduction of overall and per source measurement time.  LLNL 
supplied TV monitoring system allows U.S. monitors and plant personnel to avoid 
unnecessary exposure while remotely observing source change and relative source 
measurement operations.  Both systems were shipped to VNIITF and were successfully 
used during source replacement at ECP and UEIE and during BDMS installation at 
SChE. 
BDMS sources specifications
In 2005 LLNL provided assistance for developing the Co-57 source specifications for the 
BDMS sources at UEIE and ECP.  The source specifications were developed in a manner 
to maximize the output and the reliability of the BDMS measurements, and in the same 
time to comply with the Russian Federation radiation safety regulatory limits.  The 
specifics of the dose rate measurement instrumentation and treatment of measurement 
errors were taken into account in the development of the source specifications.
Bubble dosimeters  
During CY 2005 LLNL shipped 180 bubble dosimeters with high sensitivity (~ 20-30 
bubbles per mrem) to ECP, UEIE and SChE to support the BDMS sources changes (60 
dosimeters per campaign). Prior to shipment of the bubble dosimeters to Russia, LLNL 
tested their calibration with Cf-252 source (manufacturer calibrates them with Am-Be 
source) and, if needed, excluded or exchanged any dosimeters out of tolerance. The 
bubble dosimeters are used to measure the personal neutron doses for the involved plant, 
VNIITF and U.S. personnel, as well as, for area monitoring around BDMS.  The bubble 
dosimeter information is valuable for the U.S. monitors and the Russian personnel as an 
immediate indication in case of a significant exposure or radiation leakage from the 
BDMS shielding.  Due to uncontrolled by us delays in getting the dosimeters in time to 
the plants we maintained a back-up supply of bubble dosimeters at Pragma office in 
Ekaterinburg.   Shipping the bubble dosimeters from Pragma to any of the BDMS sites 
can be done on a short notice and takes one to two days for the dosimeters to arrive at the 
final destination.  Since the bubble dosimeters have relatively short warranty, the back-up 
supply at Pragma usually consists of dosimeters delayed from the previous shipment and 
redirected to Pragma.
Information on DARTS
The BDMS sources and bubble dosimeter information on DARTS was updated and 
expanded in the last year. The available data on DARTS in the BDMS directory include 
two folders – BDMS Sources and Bubble Dosimeters for the use of the HEU community. 
The BDMS Sources folder contains subfolders for:
· All current and past Cf-252, Co-57 an Am-241 passports for UEIE, ECP and SChE 
BDMS sources
· Co-57, Am-241 and Cf-252 source specifications for current and upcoming source 
changes/installation 
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· All radiation safety reports for the source change activities in English and the Russian 
originals for UEIE, ECP and SChE
· Tables (in Excel spreadsheet format) of the detailed dose rate (gamma+neutron) 
measurements at UEIE, ECP and SChE
· Tables (in Excel spreadsheet format) of the relative californium source measurements 
of the new, old, and the reference sources with any pertinent information for source 
changes and installations at the three plants
· Tables of the Cf-252, Co-57 and Am-241 source positions at UEIE, ECP and SChE
Bubble dosimeters' folder on DARTS contains:
· Test results from Doza (in Russian)
· Bubble dosimeter Accreditation certificate - original in Russian and the English 
translation
· Accreditation testing report and description - in Russian and in English
Reporting
In 2005 LLNL provided the following reports related to the health physics issues of the 
HEU-TP activities:
· Post trip dose reports to the DOE’s HEU-TP management after each trip
· Quarterly bioassay (internal dosimetry) reports to the DOE’s HEU-TP management
· 2004 Annual health physics report to the DOE’s HEU-TP management
· 2004 Annual Occupational Dose reports to each monitor that had a trip to Russia
· 2004 Annual Occupational Dose reports to the POC for all monitors in his area
· U.S.-Russian radiation safety report for regulatory compliance after the ECP BDMS 
source replacement (UEIE report was brought by the first SMV team in 2006)
· BDMS health physics issues were reported as part of the consensus trip report for the 
ECP source change trip
· Reports on various health physics topics requested by the HEU-TP management
In 2005, the HEU-TP activities in Russia were conducted in a radiologically safe manner 
for the HEU-TP monitors in accordance with the expectations of the HEU-TP staff, 
NNSA and DOE.  The HEU–TP now has ten years of successful experience in 
developing and providing health and safety support in meeting its technical objectives. 
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Appendix A
Evaluation of the Lower Level of Detection (LLD) for the HEU-TP TLDs 
To assess the impact of the airport x-ray screening of the luggage the readings of 15 
TLDs carried in the carry-on luggage and the readings of 12 TLDs carried in the 
checked-in luggage were evaluated. The test TLDs were carried to all Russian plants 
under the HEU Program, however, they were not used for personnel monitoring (i.e. they 
were not exposed to any radiation but airport x-ray screening and in-flight background 
radiation).  DOE Methodology for calculating the LLD is provided in the DOE Standard 
for Performance Testing of Personnel Dosimetry Systems DOE/EH-0027.  The formula 
for Low Level of Detection (LLD) is
where 
alter = k*S/(1+B)
k = 1.75 – single-sided 95% confidence level value with 5% false positive 
and negative values
S = standard deviation of readings of DOELAP test TLDs dosimeters
B = bias of DOELAP test TLD readings
σ0 = absolute standard deviation of the background dosimeters readings
Hb = average background dosimeter readings
The bias and standard deviation of DOELAP (DOE Laboratory Accreditation Program) 
readings were taken from DOELAP tests conducted previously in the lab with pre-
exposed TLDs sent for evaluation by DOELAP.  Since the x-ray energy of the airport 
screening machines is not known and it may vary from airport (or manufacturer) to 
airport (manufacturer), the bias and the standard deviation were taken for two energies: 
standard DOELAP x-ray and Cs source energies.  The more conservative of the two 
values was adopted for the LLD.
 
Calculation of the LLD for checked-in TLDs
Using the data from the TLDs transported in checked-in luggage in the airport x-ray 
exposure study yields
LLD for whole body deep dose is evaluated to be 35 mrem
LLD for the shallow (skin) dose is evaluated to be 45 mrem 
Calculation of the LLD for carry-on TLDs
Using the data from the TLDs transported in carry-on luggage in the airport x-ray 
exposure study yields
LLD for whole body deep dose is evaluated to be 20 mrem
LLD for the shallow (skin) dose is evaluated to be 18 mrem 
)1/()(2 220 alterHalterkLLD B -+= s
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Appendix B
Minimum Detectable Dose (MDD) from Uranium Bioassays
The Minimum Detectable Dose (MDD) is the lowest value of committed effective dose 
equivalent (CEDE, a dose a person will receive for 50 years following a single intake) that 
would be expected to be reliably detected based on a single bioassay result.  The bioassay 
samples undergo radiochemical preparation followed by state-of-the-art ICP (inductively 
coupled plasma) mass spectrometry analysis by LLNL bioassay lab.  The results are 
reported as a concentration of uranium by mass in the urine. Several key assumptions are 
used by the internal dose dosimetrist in the determination of any potential internal dose:   
· Average natural background is about 0.01 micrograms of U-238 per liter 
(based on LLNL and PNNL studies)
· Reference Man excretion rate = 1.4 liters per day (standard assumption)
· Breathing particle size distribution = 5 microns AMAD (standard assumption)
· Use of the new ICRP-66 lung model, and the new ICRP-67/68 etc, biokinetic 
models for uranium (ICRP = International Council on Radiation Protection)
· Different solubility classes are assumed for the main Uranium compounds 
encountered in the HEU-TP
o UF6 (uranium hexafluoride) would be very soluble (Type F) material
o Oxides of uranium (e.g., U3O8) are assumed to be moderately soluble 
(Type M) material
o Metal fumes or powder and high-fired oxides of uranium (perhaps 
U02) are assumed to be very insoluble (Type S) material.
Three of the most critical factors influencing the minimum detectable dose (MMD) are 
the physical and chemical form (solubility) of U compounds, the time between potential 
U intake and providing the bioassay sample, and uranium enrichment with U-235 and U-
234.  Although all U isotopes have approximately the same detection level by mass, their 
minimum detectable dose differs significantly.   Higher enriched uranium compounds 
have higher MDD since U-235 and especially U-234 have much higher specific activities 
then U-238.  The relationship between MMD and these three factors is provided in the 
table below and the graphs on the next pages.
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Appendix B
Material UF6 U3O8 U metal
Solubility F F F M M M S S S
Enrichment
U-235 
mass %
DU 5% 90% DU 5% 90% DU 5% 90%
Days after
intake
MDD
(rem)
MDD
(rem)
MDD
(rem)
MDD
(rem)
MDD
(rem)
MDD
(rem)
MDD
(rem)
MDD
(rem)
MDD
(rem)
3 1.49E-5 1.09E-4 3.04E-2 2.21E-4 1.75E-3 4.92E-1 2.42E-2 1.81E-1 5.71E+1
7 2.19E-5 1.61E-4 4.47E-2 2.92E-4 2.31E-3 6.50E-1 3.28E-2 2.50E-1 7.01E+1
10 2.85E-5 2.09E-4 5.81E-2 3.47E-4 2.74E-3 7.72E-1 3.92E-2 3.00E-1 8.39E+1
20 6.11E-5 4.49E-4 1.25E-1 5.35E-4 4.23E-3 1.19E+0 6.15E-2 4.70E-1 1.31E+2
30 1.12E-4 8.25E-4 2.29E-1 7.10E-4 5.62E-3 1.58E+0 8.15E-2 6.22E-1 1.74E+2
Note that MDDs in the table do not consider any chemical toxicity - only the 50-year 
committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE) received from inhalation.
One can see that urine bioassay alone is generally quite adequate for depleted U and 
natural U.  Dose monitoring sensitivity decreases rapidly as the enrichment increases, 
and as the solubility goes from Type F to Type S.  Dose sensitivity for highly enriched, 
highly insoluble uranium is very poor.  In these cases the bioassay results are 
supplemented with workplace radiological monitoring data such as airborne uranium 
concentration and surface contamination.  The relationship between MMD and U 
solubility and time after a potential intake (inhalation) is provided in graphical form for 
HEU (90% enrichment) and LEU (5% enrichment) on the next pages.
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Appendix B
Minimum Detectable Dose (CEDE) - 5% LEU
Using ICP-MS Spot Urine Sampling for U-238
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Appendix B
Minimum Detectable Dose (CEDE) - 90% HEU
Using ICP-MS Spot Urine Sampling for U-238
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Appendix C
2005 Timely Bioassay Sample Compliance
2005 Biaossay Compliance
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Appendix D
Appendix E is a separate document that is marked C/FIG-MOD
